Why does facebook strip exif data




















When I run the debug, I get this —. Unfortunately, I still have my first issue — when it gets to a photo in my one album, it just stops. I thought maybe it was just an issue with that photo, so I moved the photo to a different file and ran it again. I tried it again, and the same thing happened with the next photo.

April 16, at am. If so this could help the hunt for these locations, but it could also be a bad thing for others cause random people could just use this application to learn where others live. April 27, at pm. This site uses Akismet to reduce spam. Learn how your comment data is processed. Enter your email address to subscribe to this blog and receive notifications of new posts by email.

Email Address. Search for:. Add Exif data back to Facebook images — 0. Screenshot of the Facebook Exif tool version 0. This blog constantly pleads for website operators to do the community-minded thing and configure their sites to honor metadata. If Facebook is trying to track photos off their site, this would be a lousy way to do it.

Yes, given their scale, maybe they could glean some data about where photos that leave their site go generally. Er, check that. As a way to surveil individuals, this is a no-go.

And ever so much sneakier. Not that Facebook would actually need to employ steganography. We know that Facebook uses artificial intelligence image recognition to understand both who is in any given photo and what is happening in that photo. Likewise, AI can identify the photo itself. Thus obviating any need for tricky invisible watermarking. Think Google Images reverse search employed in grand scale by the dark side.

No need for steganography, then. As far as I know, they are the only social media platform to do so. In order to look at what Facebook does with metadata, I sent a picture on a round trip journey to and from the platform. I took a picture of an ibis and pasted onto it the entire metadata contents of the IPTC test image. Every single IPTC field was filled with a descriptive string. This last is clever from a bandwidth perspective. IIM data is very efficient indeed. XMP is much bulkier.

My bird picture came back resampled from a hefty 5. Facebook stripped the entire Exif data block, with its potentially troublesome geotagging data and bandwidth-wasting thumbnails.

As they did with the XMP data block. Content in all other fields was deleted. The ICC profile was preserved, too. So, we should relatively commend Facebook for not destroying all the copyright management information in my picture. They left enough intact that someone of benign intent downloading a photo should be able to figure out who owns it and contact that person for permission to use it.

Assuming that the photographer bothered to write their name on their image in the first place, that is. However, one might wonder why they destroyed any. One as cynical as I am might wonder that, anyway. More or less. The original purpose of the Transref field was to hold the Transmission Reference, which is a string that identifies a wirephoto by a code indicating where it came from and an arbitrary sequence number. Nowadays we use it for job ticket numbers and all sorts of things.

Facebook puts a very random-looking string of in my sample 20 alpha-numeric characters in the Transref. Twenty alpha-numeric characters could represent a number in the hundreds of nonillions.

The list of user data stored by Facebook is available in the information section. The document, published on netzpolitik. The peculiarities of interaction between governments and online services on the issue of user data expand far beyond this article. However we see it as our responsibility to warn you about the increasing amount of metadata, which is more readily available than you might think.

Under certain circumstances, online services can share that information with third parties. Apart from text information, metadata includes a thumbnail of the picture in question. That can be a problem. As we were exploring the EXIF topic, we stumbled across a curious story. Back in , television host Catherine Schwartz posted some photos on her blog. The photos, as it turned out, had been cropped — but their metadata included thumbnails of the original photos, in some of which Schwartz was unclothed.

A decade has passed since then, so developers will have dealt with this privacy threat, right? Well, we prefer not to assume. The reference image of the IPTC tests showed when a Facebook member uploads an image to the Facebook system it removes a lot of fields, keeps only a few related to rights and replaces or adds values to the Job Id and the Instructions fields.

The role of these values is not publicly documented by Facebook, so they are currently the subject of significant speculation. IPTC makes no assumptions about what the metadata values are used for, but Facebook appears to keep the value of the Instructions field constant even when the image is re-uploaded by another user.

The Job ID field on the other hand changes with each separate upload.



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